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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
UPON FEDERAL REGULATION OF
MUNICIPAL ISSUERS
INTRODUCTION
In recent times the municipal securities industry' has become
the object of increased public concern and federal scrutiny. The
Municipal securities or bonds are debt obligations issued by state and local government
entities to finance governmental operations. They can be divided generally into four catego-
ries: (1) general obligation bonds, secured by the full faith and credit of the issuing authority
to the extent of its taxing power; (2) revenue bonds, secured by revenues generated by the
project financed; (3) special obligation bonds, secured usually by special taxation; and (4)
industrial development bonds, secured by rent charged to the private industrial lessee of the
project financed by the issue. See Note, Municipal Bonds and the Federal Securities Laws:
The Results of Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND. L. REv. 561, 563-64 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Municipal Bonds]. Interest income to the holder of municipal securities
is generally exempted from the federal income tax. I.R.C. § 103(a)(1). There are, however,
certain exceptions to this exemption; notably, interest on most classes of industrial develop-
ment bonds is taxable. I.R.C. § 103(c). Until 1975, municipal securities were also exempt from
most provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975). The scope
of the tax and regulatory exemptions are substantially similar. Indeed, when a reevaluation
of the policy considerations underlying the municipal tax exception resulted in the enactment
of limitations upon the industrial development bond exemption, Revenue Expenditure Con-
trol Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a), 82 Stat. 266 (codified at I.R.C. § 103(c)), the
same limitations were imposed upon the exemption from the securities acts. Employment
Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 401, 84 Stat. 718 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c(a)(2), 78c(a)(12) (1970)).
The policy of exempting municipal securities from federal taxation and regulation rests
upon interests of federalism. The exemptions were indicative of a congressional intent to
avoid the constitutional controversy which would result from imposition of federal controls
over municipal obligations. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933). Arguably,
federal taxation of municipal bond interest or regulation of municipal bonds would impair
state power to borrow, "and would thus constitute an impermissible or at least undesirable
federal interference with an important power of the states." Note, The Limited Tax-Exempt
Status of Interest on Industrial Development Bonds Under Subsection 103(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 85 HRv. L. Rav. 1649, 1652 (1972) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Industrial Development Bonds]. It is uncertain, however, whether such federal imposition
actually is an impermissible transgression of intergovernmental immunity as well as an
affront to intergovernmental comity. See Industrial Development Bonds, supra, at 1653 n.25;
see also Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Sepa-
ration of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 682 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Tribe].
I For a discussion of the current concern for the municipal securities industry, see Casey
& Smith, A New Look at Municipal Bonds Disclosure Responsibilities in the MunicipalBond
Market, 50 ST. JoHN's L. Rev. 639, 640 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Casey & Smith].
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spiraling cost of local governmental services has forced the states
and their subdivisions to borrow increasing amounts of capital. 3 At
the same time, considerable doubt regarding the capacity of public
borrowers to honor their obligations has arisen among investors.'
The New York City fiscal crisis in particular has stimulated federal
interest in and investigation of the municipal bond market.5 This
interest led to the enactment in 1975 of legislation intended to rem-
edy what was arguably the major defect in the field - the exemp-
tion of municipal bond brokers and dealers from SEC registration
requirements.' Congress remains concerned, however, with the state
of investor confidence in the municipal bond market, and has di-
rected its attention toward the possibility of imposing a degree of
responsibility upon public issuers.7 Toward this end, several propos-
als which would provide federal regulation of municipal issuers are
In 1955, the short term debt owed by American cities equalled 8.6% of their general
revenues; by 1972, the proportion had increased to 19.1% of general revenue. Although short
term borrowing is at best a temporary solution to a municipality's fiscal problems, R. PrrTIN-
GILL & J. UPPAL, CAN CIrEs SURVIVE? 145-47 (1974), city officials occasionally may lose sight
of the essential bankruptcy of fiscal policy founded on deficit financing. Indeed, the use of
"bookkeeping gimmicks" may delay realization of the unfortunate result for some time. When
New York City's financial crisis was recognized, the city comptroller decried the city's ac-
counting system and practices, contending that they promoted fiscal irresponsibility by ena-
bling the city to spend without generating revenue. It was estimated that this irresponsibility
would cost New York more than $5.5 billion over a 15-year period to erase the resulting deficit.
Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities, 60 MINN. L. Rav. 567, 589 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Regulation].
' See Federal Regulation, supra note 3, at 587. The general investor distrust of all munic-
ipal securities which was engendered by New York City's difficulties is estimated to have
increased debt servicing costs to states and municipalities by $3 billion per year. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 19, 1975, at 48, col. 5. Loss of investor confidence has contributed to a growing demand
for greater municipal disclosure. See Casey & Smith, supra note 2, at 643-45.
' See, e.g., S. RaP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-53, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 215-31.
6 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 3(3), 3(6), 11, 13, 89 Stat.
97, 101-02, 121-27, 131-37, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o (Supp. V 1975)). (amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o (1970)). The amendments require municipal bond brokers and dealers to
register with the SEC and establish a Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. For a discus-
sion of these provisions, see Federal Regulation, supra note 3, at 572-74.
See note 8 infra. In a report accompanying the 1975 amendments to the securities laws,
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs explicitly noted the existing
exception of municipal issuers from all but the general antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws, see note 1 supra, and reaffirmed the exemption for issuers and employees of
such issuers who act pursuant to their official duties. S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
44, 95, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 221-22, 272. The Committee
observed that it was "not aware of any abuses which would justify... a radical incursion on
states' prerogatives." Id. at 44, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 222. There
does exist, however, substantial sentiment for legislation mandating greater issuer responsi-
bility, either in the form of disclosure requirements or subjection to full regulation under the
acts. See Casey & Smith, supra note 2, at 658-65.
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under consideration.8 In addition, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has begun to utilize powers long dormant in the munic-
ipal sector by employing its authority under section 20(a) of the
Securities Act of 19331 and section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193410 to investigate possible violations of the securities
laws.1'
Public concern with municipal securities has focused primarily
upon the propriety and appropriate extent of federal regulation of
municipal issuers.'2 Recently, however, because of the realization
that concern for the vitality of the federal system may affect the
extent to which state and local governments, as issuers of securities,
may validly be subjected to federal control similar to that presently
exercised over private issuers, increased attention has been directed
8 Two bills were before the Senate in 1976. The first, introduced by Senator Eagleton
late in 1975, would strike the general exemption for municipal securities embodied in § 3(a) (2)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). The second, the Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1976, proposed by Senator
Williams, would amend the 1934 Act by adding a § 13A requiring municipal issuers to disclose
certain material information in the form of annual reports and distribution statements. S.
2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The Williams bill, which had also been introduced in the
House of Represenatives, H.R. 15205, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), is considered by many to
be better suited to the peculiarities of the municipal bond industry; consequently, it has
received greater support. See Casey & Smith, supra note 2, at 662-65. Senator Eagleton's bill
was criticized as an unnecessary and unwarranted extension of SEC regulatory authority.
Several commentators noted that it fails to provide adequately for the distinctions between
the municipal securities industry and the corporate securities industry for which the regula-
tions were developed. See, e.g., id. at 662 & n.82; Federal Regulation, supra note 3, at 591
n.158.
1 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) (1970). Section 20 also authorizes the SEC to seek injunctions,
transmit evidence to the Attorney General for possible prosecution, and apply for writs of
nrandamus to compel compliance with the Act. Id. § 77t(b), (c).
,o Id. § 78u(a) (Supp. V 1975).
" On January 5, 1976, the SEC instituted an investigation of transactions in New York
City securities "to determine whether any violations of those Acts have occurred or are
occurring." Commission Press Release, Jan. 8, 1976. The Commission announced the institu-
tion of the private investigation to minimize the deleterious impact which the information
would have upon the securities markets. A stated "major reason" for the investigation was
the SEC's "desire to restore investor confidence in the municipal bond markets." Id.
12 See, e.g., Chazen, More Regulation of Municipals, Greater Disclosure on the Horizon,
176 N.Y.L.J. 112, Dec. 13, 1976, at 35, col. 1; Federal Regulation, supra note 3; Note,
Disclosure by Issuers of Municipal Securities: An Analysis of Recent Proposals and a Sug-
gested Approach, 29 VANP. L. Rav. 1017 (1976). See also Hearings on S. 2574 & S. 2969 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 155-58 (1976) (remarks of R. Carver, representing National League of
Cities). In analyzing the effect of S. 2969 upon municipalities, SEC Chairman Hills ap-
proached the issue in terms familiar to students of the balancing test employed in determin-
ing the availability of intergovernmental tax immunity, asking whether disclosure require-
ments would constitute an "undue burden" on the governmental units. Id. at 21. See also
Industrial Development Bonds, supra note 1.
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to the constitutional issues presented by federal regulation of mu-
nicipal issuers. It has been suggested that governments which fi-
nance their activities by issuing securities stand in a position funda-
mentally different from that of private issuers in that they enjoy an
immunity from private suits emanating from the eleventh amend-
ment, and, perhaps, a tenth amendment immunity from federal
infringement of state sovereignty.
Eleventh amendment immunity from suit has long had an im-
pact on state liability for causes of action based upon federal law. 3
The existence of a tenth amendment immunity was uncertain, how-
ever, until the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Ci-
ties v. Usery, 1 in which the Court recognized an affirmative tenth
amendment limitation upon the power of the federal government
to regulate certain state activities which affect interstate commerce.
Applying this limitation, the Court invalidated an attempted exten-
sion of wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) 5 to cover most public sector employees. In its opinion the
Court, in extremely broad terms, discussed the effect of federalism
restraints upon Congress' power under the commerce clause,
thereby casting doubt upon the extent to which Congress may com-
pel state compliance with laws promulgated pursuant to the com-
merce power.
This Note will examine the National League decision and will
attempt to analyze its impact on the question of governmental regu-
lation of municipal issuers. The tenth amendment rationale sug-
gested by National League will then be applied both to proposed
federal legislation calling for the implementation of increased regu-
laton of municipal issuers and to the current regulatory scheme in
an attempt to determine whether any or all of these measures are
constitutionally permissible. Finally, this Note will examine the
effect of the states' eleventh amendment immunity from suit upon
private actions brought under the federal securities laws. In this
context, questions arise concerning the implied private right of ac-
tion under rule 10b-5 and the current insistence on the part of the
Supreme Court, that congressional efforts to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity be expressly stated by Congress and unequi-
vocally accepted by a state.
11 See Doty & Petersen, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal
Securities, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 283, 351-63 (1976).
14 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
15 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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THE COMMERCE POWER AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT
For more than 40 years municipal securities have been ex-
empted from all but the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
acts. 6 To a great extent, this exemption reflects a legislative sensi-
tivity to the nature of the American federal system. 7 The question
has remained unsettled, however, as to whether there exists an af-
firmative limitation upon congressional authority to regulate state
activities under the commerce clause, or whether the limitation is
merely a matter of policy, the result of a determination by Congress
that certain functions are more appropriately reserved to the states:
a determination made by a body which, composed of representa-
tives of the several states, has weighed the states' interest as sover-
eign entities against the federal interest in the regulation of inter-
state commerce."8 It is only recently that the Supreme Court has
addressed itself to the apparent conflict between Congress'
"plenary" authority to regulate aspects of commerce and the doc-
trine of intergovernmental immunity.
In 1968 the Supreme Court, in Maryland v. Wirtz, 1s considered
l Under Securities Act of 1933 § 17(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1970), the provision for
exempted securities is inapplicable to the antifraud section. Section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), the antifraud provision, does not distinguish
between securities ordinarily exempt and other securities. Rather, any person, including any
government, political subdivision, agency, or government instrumentality, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(9) (1970), is prohibited from violating the provisions of the section.
" The Securities Act of 1933 provides exemptions from its provisions for "Unites States,
Territorial, and State obligations, or obligations of any political subdivision of these govern-
mental units." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIrV
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SEcuRITIES ExCHANGE Acr OF 1934, Item 18 (1973).
The term political subdivision, as defined by the statute, generally corresponds to those local
obligations which are exempted from federal taxation, for "[b]y such a delineation, any
constitutional difficulties that might arise with reference to the inclusion of State and munir:i-
pal obligations are avoided." Id. The original exemption for securities of public instrumental-
ities was limited to those "exercising an essential governmental function." Deletion of this
limitation the following year, Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 3(a)(2), 48 Stat. 76 (1933), as
amended Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 202(a), 48 Stat. 906 (1934) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970)), indicates a congressional intent to apply the exemp-
tion liberally, apparently in the interests of comity. See Landis, The Legislative History of
the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 39 (1959) (municipal bond exemption
was added "for obvious political reasons"). Municipal securities were accorded an exemption
from regulation under the 1934 Act only after Congress was persuaded that subjection to the
disclosure provisions would unduly burden municipal issuers. See Municipal Bonds, supra
note 1, at 582-86. Thus, the municipal exemption from the substantive provisions of the Acts
was based both upon solicitude for the possible constitutional ramifications of such regula-
tion, and upon practical considerations of comity and "politics."
11 See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
1' 392 U.S. 183 (1968), aff'g 269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967) (3-judge court).
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a constitutional challenge to legislation extending the wage and
hour provisions of the FLSA to employees of state and local govern-.
ment hospitals, institutions, and schools.2 0 The Wirtz Court ruled
that despite the substantial interference in state functions caused
by the amendments, they were a valid exercise of Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce. Minimizing the direct effect of the
law upon "sovereign state functions," Justice Harlan, author of the
majority opinion, noted that Congress was not dictating to the
states the manner in which they were to perform such functions;
rather, it was merely requiring that public employers who engage in
activities affecting commerce be subject to the strictures of the fed-
eral labor standards.2 1 In determining whether this minimal inter-
ference with state sovereignty was constitutionally permissible, the
Court had only to determine whether the labor conditions sought to
be regulated affected interstate commerce.2 2 The Court debunked
the notion that Congress' commerce clause power might be subordi-
nate to state sovereignty interests in the performance of governmen-
tal functions, deeming that argument "simply ... not tenable."'
Thus, according to Justice Harlan, the federal government's power
to regulate commerce is plenary, and countervailing interests, be
they private or state, proprietary or governmental, cannot inhibit
the exercise of that power. 4
" 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s)(4) (1970).
21 392 U.S. at 193-94.
2 Id. at 194-95.
21 Id. at 195.
214 Id. The distinction rejected by the Wirtz Court as a basis for determining the constitu-
tional "weight" to be accorded a state interest - whether that interest is governmental or
proprietary - is the standard which was developed by the Court to deal with state activity
in functions traditionally engaged in by private business. In South Carolina v. United States,
199 U.S. 437 (1905), the Court found it
reasonable to hold that, while the [national government] may do nothing by
taxation in any form to prevent the full discharge by the [state] of its governmen-
tal functions, yet, whenever a state engages in a business which is of a private
nature, that business is not withdrawn from the taxing power of the nation.
Id. at 463. Accord, Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439 (1938). The governmental-
proprietary distinction was deemed "untenable" in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572
(1946), where the Court upheld the federal government's taxation of New York State's sale
of mineral water, despite the state's contention that it was engaged in the disposition of its
resources, a "traditional and essential governmental function." Id. at 574. Justice Frank-
furter, in an opinion joined in by Justice Rutledge, reasoned that a nondiscriminatory tax
upon revenue "not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State" passed constitutional
muster since it did not amount to the taxation of a state as a state. Id. at 582. He considered
the governmental-proprietary test to be "too shifting a basis for determining constitutional
power and too entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal criterion. The essential
nature of the problem cannot be hidden by an attempt to separate manifestations of indivisi-
ble governmental powers." Id. at 580. Chief Justice Stone, in a separate concurring opinion
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Reaction to Wirtz was largely unfavorable. Several commenta-
tors objected to the Supreme Court's sweeping dismissal of state
claims of sovereignty and contended that such claims should be
accorded greater weight. 5 Indeed, the Court itself subsequently lim-
ited the scope 2  and effect 2 of the Wirtz rationale, and finally ex-
joined in by three of the eight members of the Court, refused to go as far as did Justice
Frankfurter in applying the nondiscrimination standard. Suggesting that some nondiscrimi-
natory taxes would impair a state's sovereign statutes, and agreeing that the governmental-
proprietary distinction was inappropriate for the determination of tax immunity, the Chief
Justice maintained that "when and because the subject of taxation is State property or a
State activity... we consider whether such a non-discriminatory tax unduly interferes with
the performance of the State's functions of government. If it does, then the fact that the tax
is non-discriminatory does not save it." Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
2 See 18 BuFFALo L. RaV. 330, 336-37 (1969). Many case notes, analyzing the decision of
the Wirtz 3-judge district court, suggested that the Supreme Court should adopt the view-
point that there is something less than a plenary power to regulate state functions under the
commerce clause. See, e.g., 56 GEO. L.J. 392, 399 (1967); 81 HARv. L. REv. 1572, 1575 (1968);
66 MICH. L. REv. 750, 761-71 (1968).
25 See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), where the Court upheld the applicability
to state employees of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. I, 84
Stat. 799 (expired 1974), which authorized the President to place a ceiling upon wages and
salaries. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall observed that since the statute under consid-
eration was a temporary, emergency measure intended to combat a national economic crisis,
"[t]he federal regulation in this case is even less intrusive" than that in Wirtz. Moreover,
exemption of public sector employees would have "drastically impaired" the federal emer-
gency efforts. 421 U.S. at 548. The Justice also noted that
[w]hile the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating
merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," .. . it is not without
significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
Id. at 547 n.7 (citation omitted).The Fry rationale suggested that the Court would reconsider
tenth amendment restrictions upon federal regulatory power if confronted with a more intru-
sive statutory scheme. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 47, 50 (1975).
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Fry, arguing that the Wirtz Court had misplaced its
reliance upon United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), for support of the proposition
that the federal government's plenary power to regulate commerce has the same effect against
states as against individuals. 421 U.S. at 552 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The California Court
had declined to apply to legislation enacted under the commerce clause the "state instrumen-
talities" immunity doctrine then prevalent in the area of intergovernmental tax immunity.
Although the standard for determining tax liability was subsequently modified, Justice
Rehnquiht indicated that most members of the Court maintained a belief that, in the realm
of federal taxation, principles of federalism reserved for the states a status distinct from that
applied to individuals. Id. at 556; see New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). He
questioned "why a State's immunity from the plenary authority to tax.., should have been
thought ... to be any higher on the scale of constitutional values than is a State's claim to
be free from the imposition of Congress' plenary authority under the Commerce Clause." 421
U.S. at 553-54. Justice Rehnquist suggested that state activities "sufficiently closely allied
with traditional state functions" should be beyond the purview of the commerce power. Id.
at 558.
" The Wirtz Court expressly reserved for future consideration the apparent conflict
between state immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment and the remedies provided
1977]
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pressly overruled it in National League of Cities v. Usery. 2
National League: New Viability For the Tenth Amendment
National League involved a challenge to the provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 197429 which further extended
federal wage and hour standards to cover all public agencies,
thereby completely eliminating the exemption previously afforded
the states and their political subdivisions." Contending that this
direct federal regulation of the states as public employers, while
admittedly within the scope of congressional authority under the
commerce clause, transgressed an affirmative tenth amendment
limitation on the commerce power, 31 the National League appellants
in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), (c), 217 (1970), which involve a direct action against the
employer for the unpaid compensation and liquidated damages, suits by the Secretary of
Labor for such compensation, and actions for injunctive relief by the Secretary. 392 U.S. at
199. In Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), the Court held that although state health employees were
covered under the FLSA, the eleventh amendment barred them from bringing actions for
recovery under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). While it was within the power of Congress to bring
"the States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit in a federal court," the
Court would not find, in the absence of a clear expression of purpose, that Congress had
conditioned the operation of facilities regulable under the commerce power upon state forfei-
ture of its eleventh amendment immunity. 411 U.S. at 283, 285, distinguishing Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). Justice Douglas emphasized that these employees were
not being left without a remedy; suits for recovery, or for an injunction and equitable restitu-
tion, could be brought by the Secretary of Labor, and as suits by the United States against a
state they would not be barred. 411 U.S. at 285-86. But see Note, Section 216 Fair Labor
Standards Act - A Right Without a Remedy, 43 TEMPLE L.Q. 269, 276-77 (1970).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19,
255, 260, 621-34 (Supp. V 1975)).
30 426 U.S. at 838-39. Employer was redefined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. V 1975) to
include "a public agency." "Public agency" is defined so as to include "the government of a
State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of ... a State, or political subdivision of a
State; or any interstate governmental agency." Id. § 203(x). The provision further specifies:
The employees of an enterprise which is a public agency shall for purposes of this
subsection be deemed to be employees engaged in commerce, or in the production
of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on
goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce.
Id. § 203(s)(5).
Still exempt under the general terms of the FLSA are executive, administrative, and
professional personnel, id. § 213(a)(1) (1970), while the amendments by their own terms
exempt elected officials, their appointees, and advisors. Id. § 203(e)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
1' 426 U.S. at 837. Justice Rehnquist characterized the states' complaint as an appeal
to "the established constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity consistently recog-
nized in a long series of our cases." Id. In considering the nature of this doctrine, the Court
did not indicate whether the tenth amendment is the constitutional embodiment of the
doctrine or merely an expression of the restraints inherent in the federal system. Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), had stated:
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persuaded the Supreme Court "that the 'far-reaching implications'
of Wirtz, should be overruled." 2 Recognizing that the Constitution
reserves for the states an essential role in the federal system, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the Court's intention
to preserve for the states their integrity within that system.3 3 Char-
acterizing the power to determine wages and hours of employees
performing governmental functions as an "undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty," Justice Rehnquist appeared to frame the ques-
tion dispositive of the constitutional issue as "whether these deter-
minations are 'functions essential to separate and independent ex-
istence,' so that Congress may not abrogate the States'... authority
to make them. 34
Justice Rehnquist noted that compliance with the statutory
provisions would increase substantially the cost of the affected gov-
ernmental operations and in some instances necessitate curtailment
of some important activities, such as a local affirmative action pro-
gram for police trainees. 5 Yet it was not the increased cost of gov-
[lit is not the Tenth Amendment by its terms that prohibits [such] congressional
action .... Both [the tenth and eleventh amendments] are simply examples of
the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the
States were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative author-
ity could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was competent
to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it were just
another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation.
Id. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32 426 U.S. at 840. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
had admonished the Court that federal regulation which acted to "overwhelm state fiscal
policy," id. at 203 (Douglas, J., dissenting), could "devour the essentials of state sovereignty."
Id. at 205. Adopting the analysis suggested by the dissenting opinion in the court below,
Justice Douglas examined the pervasive impact of this form of regulation: Congress was
forcing the states to either (1) increase taxes, (2) curtail the extent and quality of hospital
and educational services, (3) reduce services in other activities, or (4) avoid undertaking new
activities necessitated by developing social responsibilities. Id. at 202-03, citing Maryland v.
Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 853 (D. Md. 1967) (Northrup, J., dissenting) (3-judge court), aff'd,
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
1 426 U.S. at 842. In illustrating the Supreme Court's continuing adherence to the belief
that there are federalism limits upon otherwise plenary congressional powers, Justice
Rehnquist noted that even in Wirtz, the Court had offered the assurance that it had "ample
power to prevent . . . 'the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity.'"
Id., quoting 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968). Justice Brennan, dissenting in National League, in-
sisted that, in context, the quotation found the "ample power" to prevent this destruction,
not in an affirmative constitutional limitation, but in the Court's duty of limiting congres-
sional enactments to exercises of duly delegated power. 426 U.S. at 860 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
" 426 U.S. at 845, quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911), quoting Lane County
v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869).
2 426 U.S. at 846-47. The Court pointed to the "significant impact" which the alleged
cost of compliance would have upon state performance of governmental functions. For exam-
ple, California estimated the increased budgetary expense occasioned by the FLSA amend-
ments would be between $8 million and $16 million. Id. at 846.
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ernmental functions to which the Court objected, but rather federal
displacement of state policy decisions regarding the delivery of gov-
ernmental services.36 Regardless of the ultimate economic impact on
the states, the critical factor was the substitution of congressional
choices for those of the states in structuring a traditional state gov-
ernmental function.3 7 When Congress acts to control those tradi-
tional state "functions ... which governments are created to pro-
vide,"" it impermissibly impinges upon an essential aspect of the
state's separate and independent existence. Thus, the Court held
that federal legislation which directly displaces state structuring of
operations in areas of "traditional governmental functions" is not
within the purview of the commerce power.3
31 The majority did not believe that "particularized assessments of actual impact are
crucial to resolution of the issue presented." Id. at 851. Rather, the Court emphasized that
the federal government was circumscribing the states' exercise of discretion, as states:
The only "discretion" left to them under the Act is either to attempt to increase
their revenue to meet the additional financial burden imposed upon them by paying
congressionally prescribed wages to their existing complement of employees, or to
reduce that complement to a number which can be paid the federal minimum wage
without increasing revenue.
Id. at 848. The Court also noted that such discretion was further circumscribed in some states
by constitutional provisions forbidding deficit financing or the levy of taxes beyond certain
rates. Id. at n.15. This impairment of state discretion contravened the constitutional limit
identified by the Court despite the social benefit which would accrue as a result of federal
regulation.
11 426 U.S. at 849-50. Justice Rehnquist, in outlining the projected impact of the over-
time provisions, stressed three effects. First, because of the financial burden of mandatory
overtime disbursements, state and local governments would be forced to restructure work
periods in areas, such as police and fire protection, where it had been commonly accepted
practice to schedule working hours very flexibly. Second, there would be unavoidable over-
time expenses which would present a hardship in any governmental activity "where the
demand for a number of employees to perform important jobs for extended periods on short
notice can be both unpredictable and critical." Finally, courts would be put to deciding
whether individuals such as volunteer firemen were "volunteers" or "employees," a circum-
stance establishing that "provisions such as these contemplate a significant reduction of
traditional volunteer assistance which has been in the past drawn on to complement the
operation of many local governmental functions." Id. at 850-51. It should be noted, however,
that the FLSA did make provision for the particular overtime difficulties inherent in the areas
of fire protection and law enforcement. 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (Supp. V 1975).
- 426 U.S. at 851. The Court identified as typical of these traditional, essential govern-
mental functions "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation." The majority carefully noted, however, that this was not an exhaustive list of
the activities "well within the area of traditional operations" performed by local governments
in their discharge of public administration and public services responsibility. Id. at 851 n.16
& accompanying text.
11 Id. at 852. In so holding, the Court expressly overruled Wirtz, finding its reasoning to
be based upon dictum from United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which was tersely
characterized as "simply wrong." The offending passage had stated:
[W]e look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as mark-
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Justices Marshall and White joined in an acrimonious dissent
authored by Justice Brennan, who decried the majority's "patent
usurpation of the role reserved for the political process by their
purported discovery in the Constitution of a restraint derived from
sovereignty of the States on Congress' exercise of the commerce
power."4 Justice Brennan maintained that although the existence
of such a restraint had been pressed in the early days of our constitu-
tional jurisprudence, it had been decisively rejected in favor of the
principle that Congress' duly delegated commerce power is plenary,
restrained only by political processes and those limitations
"prescribed in the constitution."'4' Invoking the old wisdom, the
ing the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no
such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no
more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an
individual.
Id. at 185, quoted in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976) (emphasis
added). For an exposition of Justice Rehnquist's position that this dictum in California was
erroneous, see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Although it overruled Wirtz, the National League Court simply distinguished Fry. Jus-
tice Rehnquist observed that the statute involved in that case was a response to what
amounted to a national economic emergency which could only be forestalled by collective
national action. The action authorized in Fry interfered with state freedom for a very limited
time, and did not restructure state operations, but merely "froze" the wage scales then in
effect. Finally, and significantly, pressures on state budgets were decreased rather than
increased by the statute. These facts served to validate the statute in Fry, for according to
the National League Court, "[t]he limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress
seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments
tailored to combat a national emergency." 426 U.S. at 853.
426 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
, Id. at 857-58 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan stated that the Court was repudiating
a principle of judicial interpretation enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall:
[Tihe power over commerce.., is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be
in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the
exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at elections, are ... the sole restraints
on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints
on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
Id. at 857, quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added by Brennan, J.).
The recognition by the Supreme Court of limitations "prescribed in the constitution"
extends, Justice Brennan asserted, only to express restraints. 426 U.S. at 858, citing Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (fifth amendment); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968) (sixth amendment); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (first
amendment). He disputed the majority's characterization of the tenth amendment as "an
express declaration of limitation," finding its meaning clear: Congress may not exercise
powers not constitutionally delegated. Legislation within the ambit of the commerce power
thus does not run afoul of the tenth amendment. As Justice Brennan observed, "[e]ven the
author of [the majority] opinion stated in Fry that the Tenth Amendment does not 'by its
terms' restrict Congress' power to regulate commerce." 426 U.S. at 861 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1977]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:565
dissent contended that judicial review of legislation enacted pur-
suant to the commerce clause is in all instances limited to determin-
ing whether that legislation is a regulation of interstate commerce. 2
Justice Brennan insisted that the Court's alleged power to preserve
state sovereignty from "utter destruction"43 is no more than the
power to invalidate enactments not within the authority of the com-
merce clause." By participating in regulable commerce, the dissent
asserted, a state subjects itself and its employment relations to
congressional regulation; the degree to which such regulation is
applicable to state activities is a question to be resolved by a federal
policy judgment made within a political system structured to pro-
vide the states with substantial input in the decision."
Although Justice Brennan was perhaps rightly troubled by the
sweeping language found in the majority opinion, his characteriza-
tion of the decision as "mischievous"" appears to be inappropriate.
Despite the dissent's claim that the majority disregarded 150 years
of precedent in finding a limitation upon the commerce power,47
Justice Rehnquist's position is not without authority. Although in
recent decades the Supreme Court embraced a nationalist view of
the Constitution, the National League decision is not without a
theoretical underpinning; it is reminiscent of the nineteenth century
doctrine of dual federalism." Moreover, the Court has given notice
" Justice Brennan declared: "This Court is simply not at liberty to erect a mirror of its
own conception of a desirable governmental structure.... Under the Constitution the judici-
ary has no role to play beyond finding that Congress has not made an unreasonable legislative
judgment respecting what is 'commerce.'" 426 U.S. at 875-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, who dissented separately, sympathized with the majority's concern for the
wisdom of the legislation in issue, but regarded the matter as a policy question suitable for
political, not judicial determination. Id. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
a See note 33 supra.
" 426 U.S. at 860 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justices Brennan and Stevens both believed that the states possess sufficient political
power to protect their interests. Id. at 876-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 881 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also referred to the vast financial assistance provided the
states by the federal government as an indication of the political power of the states; to
Justice Brennan, this demonstrated ability to obtain federal money left little doubt that state
sovereignty, within the federal political system, was secure. Id. at 878 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
. Id. at 880. Justice Brennan also detected "an ominous portent of disruption of our
constitutional structure implicit" in the holding. Id.
,1 Id. at 857.
4 Two competing theories of national power vied for acceptance during the nineteenth
century. Under the nationalist theory espoused by Hamilton, the federal government, al-
though admittedly one of enumerated powers, was, within the scope of those powers, a
sovereign government "under no constitutional compulsion.., to take account of the coexist-
ence of the states or to concern itself to preserve any particular relationship of power between
itself and the states." E. CoRwiN, THE TWILGHT OF THE SUPREME CouRT 47 (1934). The other
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in recent years that it intends to be more solicitous of state interests
in the future." Indeed, the Court's readiness to invalidate congres-
sional legislation affecting state autonomy may indicate a determi-
nation by the Court that the political safeguards contemplated in
the Constitution under the federal system have ceased to function
effectively. 0 The National League dissent declared that "[j]udi-
cial restraint in this area merely recognizes that the political
branches of our Government are structured to protect the interests
of the States, . . . [which] are fully able to protect their own in-
terests in the premises."51 Where, however, the political structure
has been altered so that it is no longer responsive to state interests,
judicial scrutiny would appear to be an appropriate means of re-
dressing the imbalance. 2
approach, advocated by Jefferson and Madison, was to treat the Constitution as a compact
among the states. This approach was oriented toward preservation of state sovereignty
through "that greatest of constitutional contrivances, dual federalism." Id. at 48. Both view-
points were thoroughly developed in the jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, and "by the
year 1885 the Court found itself able in all cases raising the question of national power to
choose between two well matured but sharply divergent traditions." Id. Dual federalism
proved ill suited for "the actualities of commerce and industry today," id. at 50, and Professor
Corwin, finding it of little help in adjusting the constitutional system to twentieth century
needs, stated that "ineluctable forces" had chosen a nationalistic approach. Id. at 51.
11 The judicial inclination to accord greater respect to state interests can be seen in
several areas. The states have enjoyed some degree of immunity from federal taxation
throughout the years, even if only insulation from taxes so burdensome as to threaten govern-
mental destruction. See Tribe, supra note 1, at 712 (tax invalid if it undermines "state
government's very survival"). But see New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 584 (1946)
(Stone, C.J., concurring) (undue interference standard applied).
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), noted in The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85
HAav. L. REv. 38, 152 (1971), the Supreme Court struck down a legislative attempt to dictate
minimum voting age in state elections. Recently, three federal appellate courts invalidated
federal administrative efforts under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1972 to compel state
enforcement of federal regulations aimed at achieving approved ambient air quality stan-
dards. Interpreting Wirtz in light of Fry, these courts construed arguably ambiguous statutory
provisions and legislative history to leave the EPA Administrator without statutory authority
to compel state enforcement of the Act, thereby avoiding an adjudication of the constitutional
issue. See District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 990-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976) (No. 75-1055); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224-28 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976) (No. 75-960); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 837-42 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976) (No. 75-909). But see Pennsylvania v. EPA,
500 F.2d 246, 257, 259-63 (3d Cir. 1974) (compulsion is statutorily authorized and constitu-
tionally valid under Wirtz).
" See note 52 infra.
" 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52 Evidence of the need for an adjustment in traditional federalism concepts may be
found in the area of water pollution legislation. It is illustrated by the failure of the states to
achieve adequate input in the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975)). The amendments
have been criticized as enacting "uniform national legislation rather than a flexible federal
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Justice Brennan clearly presents a plausible objection to the
National League Court's conclusion that there exists a federalism
limitation upon the commerce power. Asserting that the states con-
stitute sovereign entities only to the extent that they have not dele-
gated their sovereign powers to the national government, he main-
tained that the most notable of the powers delegated was the au-
thority to regulate interstate commerce.53 Since the federal govern-
ment possesses whatever degree of power the state would have re-
tained were it not for the delegation, it is no invasion of sovereignty
for Congress to exercise the delegated power to its fullest. Thus, the
reasoning of the dissent leads to the conclusion that no otherwise
valid congressional exercise of the commerce power will impair the
integrity of the states. The majority, on the other hand, recognized
a limitation on the commerce power inherent in the tenth amend-
ment and declared that transgression of that limitation invalidates
the exercise of the power, even though the exercise itself would
otherwise be valid under the commerce clause. Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that a primary objective implicit in the Constitution is
the continued vitality of the federal system, a system which contem-
plates preservation of the integrity of each state as the feature dis-
tinguishing it from a unitary national entity with administrative
subdivisions. 4 Toward this end, the majority noted, the Court has
law." H. LIEBER, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS 193 (1975). State and local representation,
in theory an effective political safeguard of state interests, received expression in the form of
"pork barrel" benefits, while substantive provisions reflected a strong federal presence, serv-
ing to enhance the stature of Congressmen as national legislators. Id. State efforts to lobby
directly for favorable legislation were hampered by disunity. Id. at 194. Indeed, the effect of
the legislation creates doubts as to the propriety of a purely political limitation upon the
commerce power:
The thrust of the new legislation is clearly in the direction of a federal takeover and
away from the. .. intergovernmental power sharing which ... has been confirmed
for past environmental policies. This loss of partnership seems to be part of a
general trend towards centralization in policy formulation and implementation that
was noted in the 1960's. This Act and its implementation moves the federal role
beyond dominance and closer to preemption of water pollution policy.
Id. at 201.
" See 426 U.S. at 864 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In South Carolina v. United States,
199 U.S. 437 (1905), the Court observed that "two propositions in our constitutional juris-
prudence are no longer debatable. One is that the national government is one of enumerated
powers; and the other, that a power enumerated and delegated by the Constitution to Con-
gress is comprehensive and complete, without other limitations than those found in the
Constitution itself." Id. at 448. For a discussion of the plenary nature of the federal commerce
power in relation to state activities, see note 59 and accompanying text infra.
-1 See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224
(1976) (No. 75-909), where the Ninth Circuit rejected the EPA's contention that its statutory
authority was sufficient to compel state adoption and enforcement of federal environmental
policy. The pre-National League panel rejected this interpretation because of its constitu-
tional implications:
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moved over the years to strike down numerous enactments which
were thought to assert too firm a control over a state's political and
judicial processes. 5
While it cannot seriously be contested but that, through dint
of circumstance, the United States today requires a constitutional
theory permitting the federal government broad discretion in the
exercise of its sovereign powers," it remains questionable whether
this discretion should include a plenary power to regulate every
state activity bearing a rational relationship to interstate com-
merce. The existence of a plenary power under the commerce clause
was propounded before the full extent of the commerce power was
recognized. 7 As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissenting opinion
in Fry v. United States," the presumptions underlying the conclu-
sion that the commerce power admits of no distinctions between
individuals and states were rather rashly made, and thus are analyt-
To make governance indistinguishable from commerce for the purposes of the Com-
merce Power cannot be equated to the "unintrusive" regulation of economic activi-
ties of the states upheld by the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz and Fry v.
United States. A Commerce Power so expanded would reduce the states to puppets
of a ventriloquist Congress. We will not attribute to Congress any such intent unless
it is expressed unequivocally.
521 F.2d at 839 (emphasis in original). The court stressed that its concern was "to preserve
and protect a strong government of the United States and viable governments of the states."
Id. at 840.
In 1974, a similar objection was voiced to proposed federal legislation which would have
mandated state "no-fault" insurance. One commentator recommended a careful study of this
scheme of federal coercion so as to ensure that it did not "impair the essence of federalism
by intruding on state autonomy in a manner not contemplated by the Constitution." Dorsen,
The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: A Problem in Federalism, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 45, 47 (1974).
"See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (invalidation of statute enfranchising
18-year-olds in state elections); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (Congress is without
power to condition statehood upon location of capital). In Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 71 (1868), the Court construed a federal statute making United States notes legal
tender for debts as having no application to payment of state tax levies. Faced with an Oregon
statute requiring payment of taxes in gold and silver coin, Chief Justice Chase observed that
it was not clear whether Congress had the power to interfere with this exercise of the state
taxing power. Through a strict construction of the federal statute, however, the Court found
that it was reasonable to conclude that no such interference was intended and that Congress
had never sought to require that federal notes be legal tender for state tax payments. Id. at
77-78.
"' See generally W. ANDERSON, INTERGOVER 0 NTAL RELATIONS IN REvmw 16-33 (1960).
The principle of a plenary commerce power was expounded early in the course of
American constitutional history. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
It was not until well into the twentieth century, however, that Congress was freed "from the
anachronistic and doctrinally unsound constructions of the Commerce Clause which had
previously been used to deny ... to Congress authority to regulate economic affairs." Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 551 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
a 421 U.S. 543, 549 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ically suspect: the Court had accustomed itself to refuting the con-
tention that federal regulation of private commercial enterprises
infringed upon state prerogatives, and it did not take cognizance of
the fundamentally different nature of the contention that regulation
of state enterprises involves issues of federalism. 9 National League
represents an effort to reassess the relationship between the com-
merce power and state prerogatives within the federal system.
ANALYSIS OF National League
The restrictions which the Court has chosen to place upon legis-
lation which affects a state's integrity is left unsettled by National
League because of the broad and imprecise language utilized in the
majority opinion. Justice Rehnquist stated without explanation
that determination of wages and hours is an "undoubted attribute
of state sovereignty."' 0 He then summarily concluded that this de-
termination is a function essential to the separate and independent
existence of the state, and hence immune from regulation. This
conclusion was reached because the Court believed that federal in-
terference would displace state policy regarding "integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions.""1
It is suggested that the National League opinion could be inter-
preted as espousing either of two differing theories of tenth amend-
ment immunity: that an affirmative constitutional limitation pre-
cludes direct congressional regulation of activities which are deemed
traditional and integral state functions; or that a state is immune
from regulation of an activity, be it traditional or not, when the
ultimate impact of such regulation is the displacement of state poli-
cies with respect to traditional state functions.2
11 Id. at 551. Justice Rehnquist dismissed as inappropriate any reliance upon the Court's
refusal, in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183 (1936), to distinguish between state
governmental and proprietary activities in a commerce power context. Justice Rehnquist
pointed out in Fry that California was decided at a time when the commerce clause was
undergoing a process of reevaluation from a limited construction which under a state sover-
eignty theory had even impeded federal regulation of private industry. 421 U.S. at 551
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 19-20 (1934).
Under these circumstances, the Justice found it understandable that the California Court was
so quick to reject the state's "sovereign capacity" claim, for "[tihe claim of 'states' rights'
had so frequently been involved in the past as a form of ius tertii, not by a State but by a
business enterprise seeking to avoid congressional regulation, that the different tenor of the
claim made by the State of California may not have impressed the Court." 421 U.S. at 551
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
426 U.S. at 845.
,l Id. at 852.
,2 Although the Court devoted much attention to the economic effect of the federal
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The Traditional Governmental Function Requirement and
Intimations of a Balancing Approach
The National League holding was narrowly drawn: the chal-
lenged amendments were invalid to the extent that they "operate
to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions." 3 Thus, the
first obstacle which faces any governmental unit attempting to ex-
tend the Court's holding beyond the field of labor relations is the
possibility that the Court might limit the protected area of state
activities to those functions which can be characterized as tradi-
tional or integral. If the Court is unwilling to extend protection to
state activities which it regards as nontraditional or nonintegral,"4
a state challenge to federal regulation of municipal securities would
fail were the financing function not to be regarded as a traditional
or integral governmental function. Such a limitation upon tenth
amendment immunity, however, would be difficult to apply. Efforts
to distinguish between traditional and nontraditional, or integral
and nonintegral functions, for purposes of placing a limit upon the
scope of state immunity from taxation or suit, have failed to estab-
lish any reliable criteria for characterizing a particular function as
either integral or nonintegral. 5 The proprietary-governmental dis-
tinction, which reflects the notion that functions which are govern-
mental in nature, as opposed to state activities which are merely
proprietary, should not be subjected to undue interference by an-
other governmental authority, has long been recognized as unsatis-
factory.6
legislation, id. at 846-47, it disclaimed reliance upon the cost of compliance in reaching its
holding. Id. at 851. Justice Brennan, in dissent, agreed with the majority that actual impact
should not be determinative of the constitutional issue, since financial impact upon the states
is a policy decision which has long been reserved to the political process. Id. at 874 n.12
(Brennan, J., dissenting), citing Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 527 (1941)
(effectiveness of flood control efforts is a policy question for Congress). Justice Brennan
feared, however, that the Court would henceforth feel free to invalidate legislation of even
insignificant added cost, a portent which he considered "ominous." 426 U.S. at 875 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 852 (Rehnquist, J.).
See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
See Doty & Petersen, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal
Securities, 71 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 283, 362-63 (1976).
16 The difficulties with the integral/nonintegral characterization were recognized by Jus-
tice Rehnquist in his dissent in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 (1975). Although
employing this criterion in the area of intergovernmental tax immunity, the Supreme Court
in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) declined to utilize the governmental-
proprietary test to scrutinize legislation enacted pursuant to the commerce power. The Court
distinguished the intergovernmental tax immunity as one "implied from the nature of our
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Analysis of the Court's rationale is further complicated by Jus-
tice Rehnquist's consideration of the actual impact 7 on the state of
the federal regulations. Although the Court noted that the extent of
the impact was not determinative in National League, one could
infer from the opinion that impact might be dispositive under other
circumstances. In instances where a national regulatory scheme so
substantially disrupts the performance of nontraditional state activ-
ities as to abrogate the state's decisionmaking capacity with respect
to traditional functions, 8 resolution of a constitutional challenge by
analysis of the regulation's ultimate impact would appear to be a
justifiable application of an immunity which purports to prevent
impairment of "the States' 'ability to function effectively within a
federal system.' "69 It should be noted, however, that although
such an inference may be drawn from a careful reading of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, the specific holding of the Court extended
immunity only to "integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions" which had suffered direct displacement.0
federal system," and, significantly, as a reciprocal restriction. Id. at 184-85. The validity of
this distinction soon came under criticism. In Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), the Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Black, rejected an essential state function standard as a guide
to the limits of congressional authority in the exercise of the war power. In so doing the Court
noted that "[tihe use of the same criterion in measuring the Constitutional power of Con-
gress to tax has proved to be unworkable." Id. at 101, citing New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572 (1946).
Justice Rehnquist nevertheless contended in Fry that activities "sufficiently closely al-
lied with traditional state functions" should be beyond substantive federal regulation under
the commerce power. Admitting that gray areas presented by this approach would require
case by case elucidation, 421 U.S. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), he observed that
California had rejected all distinctions between types of state activities, but that
a line will have to be drawn somewhere. It is conceivable that the traditional
distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" activities might in some
form prove useful in such line drawing. The distinction suggested in New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), between activities traditionally undertaken by
the State and other activities, might also be of service.
Id. at n.2.
" See 426 U.S. at 846-51.
" Such a situation arguably may exist regarding the municipal financing function. See
text accompanying notes 81-82 infra.
" 426 U.S. at 852, quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975). For an exposi-
tion of such an application, see Note, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Threat to
Federalism?, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (1976). Justice Rehnquist detailed the anticipated in-
creased fiscal burden upon states and municipalities occasioned by the FLSA legislation, and
also noted examples of "forced relinquishment of important governmental activities." 426
U.S. at 846-47. It was because the legislation directly displaced state wage and hour policy
in the area of traditional operations, however, that Congress acted impermissibly "even if
appellants may have overestimated the effect which the Act will have upon their current
levels and patterns of governmental activity." Id. at 851.
10 426 U.S. at 852.
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The National League Court spoke in absolute terms of an af-
firmative limitation upon the federal commerce power, suggesting
that traditional state functions should be regarded as paramount to
federal legislation. Nowhere did Justice Rehnquist intimate that it
is appropriate to balance federal interests in a regulatory scheme
against state interests in the maintenance of integral functions. Yet
Justice Blackmun's pivotal concurrence in Justice Rehnquist's
opinion rested upon such an understanding. It was Justice Black-
mun's belief that although the National League Court claimed that
Fry v. United States, wherein the Court upheld the application of
federal wage ceilings to the states, was distinguishable as an ac-
quiescence to temporary emergency measures, 71 it was nonetheless
in essence a recognition of the need to balance interests. Thus,
Justice Blackmun stated that the National League decision did not,
for example, "outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental
protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and
where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards
would be essential. '7 2 Although it would require an extremely imagi-
native reading of Justice Rehnquist's opinion to find within it any
intention to balance federal and state interests, it appears that, at
least for the foreseeable future, the Court will invalidate federal
legislation only after the competing interests have been weighed,
and the state interest deemed superior.
Extending National League: Regulation of Municipal Issuers
The National League rationale suggests at least two possible
approaches for disposing of a tenth amendment challenge to federal
regulation of municipal issuers. By narrowly construing the deci-
sion, the Court could regard as determinative the characterization
of deficit financing as traditional or nontraditional. Alternatively,
under a broader construction the Court could conclude that the
state's deficit financing activity is a function protected from federal
interference under the commerce clause simply by finding that the
ultimate impact of such regulation is the substantial impairment of
state policymaking in the area of traditional functions.
Should the Court limit immunity to traditional or integral
functions, a challenge to federal regulation of municipal issuers
would fail if the deficit financing function was not deemed tradi-
" Id. at 853, citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 547 (1975); see note 26 infra.
72 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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tional in nature. If the broader standard were to be utilized, a dis-
ruptive economic impact upon traditional policymaking functions
would apparently be sufficient to justify immunity. This approach
would virtually assure a finding that municipal issuers enjoy the
protection of the tenth amendment. In either case, application of a
balancing test would prevent an overbroad assertion of state sover-
eignty where significant federal interests require a regulatory
scheme national in scope.73 If the federal regulations were found to
" The federal courts which have considered National League have construed its holding
narrowly, thereby belying Justice Brennan's contention that it strikes "a catastrophic judicial
body blow at Congress' power under the Commerce Clause." 426 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The opinions are hardly uniform, however, illustrating the vagueness of the
Supreme Court's pronouncement and the difficulties facing courts which endeavor to apply
the National League rationale. To the extent that the legislation under attack is predicated
upon the commerce power, these cases may be taken as fair statements of the manner in
which courts will construe National League.
One area of recent controversy regarding federal-state relations involves actions under
the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). This provision, prohibiting discrimination in
pay on the basis of sex, was one of the labor standards extended to the states by the enact-
ments deemed invalid under National League. See note 30 supra. In Usery v. Dallas Indepen-
dent School Dist., [19761 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages & Hours) (CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.) 33,437
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1976), a district court denied the school district's motion, based on
National League, to dismiss a Department of Labor action seeking to enforce the statute. The
court noted that the Supreme Court's decision did not directly affect the challenged provi-
sion, id. at 47,552-53; nor did it "vanquish this legislation by virtue of its bold language and
irresistible sweep." Id. at 47,554. Rather, the court contended that the National League
rationale "should be applied very conservatively in overturning social and economic policies
of the Congress." Id. After viewing the applicable authority, Judge Hill was satisfied that the
affirmative limitation upon the commerce power would be restricted to those situations in
which three criteria are met: First, the affected function must be "integral"; second, interfer-
ence with the function must substantially disrupt state operations; and third, state interests
must be balanced against federal policies. Id. at 47,554-55.
In regard to the first factor, the integral nature of the function, the district court was
troubled by the Supreme Court's imprecise characterizations of "the protected areas of state
sovereignty." Reciting the formulations suggested in Justice Rehnquist's opinion-"functions
essential to separate and independent existence," activities of "States qua States," and
"integral government functions"-Judge Hill appeared less than enamored with the Court's
efforts to elucidate which sovereign interests it intends to protect. He noted that the National
League opinion did not detail the attributes of an "integral government function," and that
the Court seemed less concerned with the degree to which an activity could be deemed
essential than with the extent to which it could be considered traditional: "The federal
government cannot apparently dictate minimum wages for the city policemen or the janitor
at a livestock show under county sponsorship." Id. at 47,554. Despite the vagueness of these
formulations, the district court concluded that the protected areas must involve internal,
administrative, management, and housekeeping functions, thereby excluding any state pro-
prietary interest and other activities "involving a significant interface with the public do-
main," such as the sale of commodities to the public. Id. at 47,555.
In regard to the second characteristic suggested as indicative of an activity within the
ambit of National League, the Dallas court reasoned that Justice Rehnquist's recital of costly
budget displacements and economic coercion indicated that legislation is offensive when it
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imposes "a drastic and disruptive cost of doing business on the state." Id. Judge Hill believed
it self-evident that no disruptive impact resulted from the requirement that states not dis-
criminate against their employees according to sex. In what amounted to a suggestion that
the states eat cake if they have no bread, he noted that "if the States find prohibitive the
costs of increasing women's wages to a standard level to be paid both sexes, the Supreme
Court has now given its benediction to the States' reducing men's wages to any convenient
substandard level to be paid both sexes." Id. Unfortunately, this rather intriguing solution
contravenes the Equal Pay Act's express provision "that an employer who is paying a wage
rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions
of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
Finally, the Dallas court viewed the ultimate limitation upon the principle of National
League to be the balancing of federal and state interests. Noting the Supreme Court's effort
to distinguish its holding from that in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), Judge Hill
expressed the opinion that the cases were reconcilable only "on the basis of an ad hoc
balancing." [1976] 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages & Hours) (CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.) 33,437, at 47,555.
Apparently deeming it unnecessary to illuminate the precise nature of this balancing process,
he simply concluded "that the policies of social justice underlying the legislation outweigh
the State interest in exploiting employees because of their sex." Id. at 47,555 n.6.
Other courts which have passed upon the constitutionality of the Equal Pay Act also have
had little difficulty in sustaining the statute. None, however, has formulated a framework
for effective analysis of tenth amendment challenges to the commerce power. See Usery v.
University of Tex., [1976] 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages & Hours) (CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.) 33,448
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 1976) (sex discrimination not essential to a state); Usery v. Fort Madison
Community School Dist., [1976] 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages & Hours) (CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.)
33,419 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 1, 1976) (Equal Pay provisions a minimal intrusion upon state
activities); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., [1976] 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages &
Hours) (CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.) 33,418 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 1, 1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F.
Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976) (pay differentials are not fundamental employment decisions).
Other courts, determining the validity of the statute without reference to congressional
power under the commerce clause, have justified the Equal Pay Act as a legitimate exercise
of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment. Even absent congressional reliance
upon the amendment as a source of power for the enactment and extension to the states of
the Equal Pay Act, the issue of its constitutionality can thus be foreclosed by reliance upon
alternative predicates for the exercise of federal power. See Usery v. Allegheny County Inst.
Dist., [1976] 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages & Hours) (CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.) 33,440 (3d Cir. Oct.
28, 1976); Usery v. Washoe County School Dist., [1976] 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages & Hours)
(CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.) 33,438 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 1976). For a discussion of the inapplicability
of the National League holding to legislation enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment,
see Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local Governments: The Effect of
National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 665 (1977).
One federal district court has also upheld application of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), to state employees. In Usery
v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976), the court determined that
the age discrimination prohibition embodied in 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1970) was properly ex-
tended to states and their subdivisions by 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (Supp. V 1975). The court
construed National League in light of Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion and the Fry case
to require the balancing of federal and state interests where integral state functions are
affected. The court identified the federal interest supporting age discrimination legislation
as the concern for preventing arbitrary age discrimination in employment. When balanced
against the state's "nominal interest" in arbitrary employment selection the national interest
was clearly superior. 421 F. Supp. at 720. As an alternative rationale supporting the constitu-
tionality of the enactment, the court pointed to the absence of a direct displacement of state
freedom to structure "integral operations"; rather, the effect of the legislation was negative
and indirect, with little impact upon the municipal employment structure. Id.
For an interpretation of National League in a nonlabor context, see Friends of the Earth
v. Carey, Civ. No. 75-7497 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 1977) (dictum) (impact of federal environmental
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infringe upon protected state activities, the federal interest in a
degree of control over the municipal bond market would then have
to be weighed against the state interest in the policymaking auton-
omy afforded it by deficit financing unfettered by federal interfer-
ence. A balancing approach would appear to afford state interests
in state activities the same degree of protection they theoretically
should enjoy within the federal political process." Indeed, a number
of lower federal court decisions subsequent to National League have
opted for a balancing approach.7 5
regulations upon transportation control "neither marginal nor directed toward an integral
governmental function").
" See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 558-60(1954).
" See, e.g., Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., [1976] 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages &
Hours) (CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.) 33,437 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1976); Usery v. Salt Lake City
Bd. of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976). Several other courts have disposed of tenth
amendment challenges without reaching the question of a balancing process, see note 73
supra, and in at least one case a district court expressed its opinion in terms which appear
to deny the applicability of a balancing test to federalism limitations upon the commerce
power. Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976). It was that court's opinion
that there are "attributes of sovereignty" which Congress may not impair when acting pur-
suant to the commerce clause. Id. at 425.
Interestingly, however, the federal courts appear reluctant to construe the National
League decision in a manner inimical to other federal legislation. See note 73 supra. Broader
interpretation may be forthcoming from state courts. For instance, in Staten Island Rapid
Transit Operating Auth. v. IBEW Local 922, 177 N.Y.L.J. 42, Mar. 3, 1977, at 12, col. 4 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County), the New York State Supreme Court, Kings County, cited National
League as a reaffirmance of "the untrammeled right of States to protect their sovereignty and
economic integrity to make fundamental employment decisions in regard to the performance
of vital public services." Id. at 13, col. 1. The court utilized National League to buttress its
conclusion that the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-60 (1970), does not preempt the
state's power to prohibit public employees from striking under the Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ.
SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1973). Justice Jones ruled that "[u]nder the Taylor Law, and
the common law, the City of New York has the plenary right and responsibility to protect its
economy from being disrupted to the point of disaster by a strike of its public employees."
177 N.Y.L.J. 42, Mar. 3, 1977, at 12, col. 5.
Although the court may have reached the correct result in upholding the state statute,
it is submitted that use of the National League rationale to avert preemption by federal
legislation is unwarranted and inadvisable. Although Justice Brennan accused the National
League majority of "signaling abandonment of the heretofore unchallenged principle" of
federal supremacy, 426 U.S. at 875, the majority in no way suggested that state legislation
will control when it conflicts with a valid federal statute. Before considering the issue of
federal preemption, a court must determine whether a statute regulating a state activity
transgresses the limitation enunciated in National League. If a statute is adjudged valid
under this standard, the court should then address the issue of preemption. The supremacy
clause, U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2, must be viewed independently of congressional authority
under the commerce clause. It is a constitutional provision which takes force only when
Congress enacts valid legislation, and when confronted with a duly-enacted regulation "a
State cannot disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to her
power." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), quoted in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
454-55 (1976). The Fitzpatrick decision indicates that the Court did not intend a sweeping
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Should the Court elect to proceed upon the narrow application
of tenth amendment immunity, a challenge to the validity of munic-
ipal issuer regulation could pose serious definitional problems, for
the question of whether deficit financing is a traditional or integral
function is firmly rooted in what Justice Rehnquist has termed a
"gray area." 8 Assuming, arguendo, that these terms are simply a
means to identify objectively those state activities believed to merit
protection, 7  then an analysis of the municipal financing function,
or any other state activity, under the National League rationale will
amount to an application of the governmental-proprietary test. As
noted previously, this differentiation has not been well received.
Although a seemingly simple method of determining whether a state
activity is a traditional governmental responsibility involving the
kind of function "which governments are created to provide, 78 it
has proved troublesome to apply. If not considered governmental,
then an activity is deemed proprietary: one which is ordinarily en-
gaged in by private industry. 79 Although some activities are readily
restructuring of the balance of federal and state power. In National League, the Court had
declined to state "whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral
operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under sections of the
Constitution such as the Spending Power .... or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 426
U.S. at 852 n.17. Shortly after its decision in National League, the Court in Fitzpatrick
apparently resolved the question with respect to the fourteenth amendment. In Fitzpatrick,
the State of Connecticut defended a class action brought by male employees alleging a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), by
interposing as a bar to retroactive monetary relief the eleventh amendment immunity eluci-
dated in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Supreme Court reversed the denial of
such relief by both the circuit and district courts, finding that because Congress had expressly
authorized private actions against states in Title VII, "[o]ur analysis begins where Edelman
ended." 427 U.S. at 452. Intimating that a stricter standard for constructive waiver would
be applied when Congress acted pursuant to its authority under the commerce clause, id. at
452-53, the Court determined that eleventh amendment immunity is limited by the four-
teenth amendment, because § 5 constitutes express authority to enforce the prohibitions
directed against the states in the other sections of the amendment. The Court believed "that
Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." Id. at 456, citing Edel-
man v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
' See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
State claims of immunity from federal interference normally are premised upon the
theoretical inviolability of the state when it acts as a state. See, e.g., New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (state contended that bottling and sale of mineral water was a
"traditional and essential governmental function"); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936) (state contended that its not-for-profit railroad constituted a public function per-
formed in its sovereign capacity).
7' National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Wel-
fare, 411 U.S. 279, 284 (1973).
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classified, difficulties arise when a state engages in an activity
which possesses both commercial and governmental characteristics.
A court presented with such a situation must undertake the often
delicate and frustrating task of categorizing the activity as either
governmental or proprietary.
Issuance of securities as a mode of finance is an excellent exam-
ple of a state activity which presents a troublesome categorization
problem. Since it is an activity engaged in by governments and
private corporations alike, it is neither solely governmental nor
solely proprietary in nature. It is not a traditional governmental
activity in the sense of a function which governments are created
to provide, for financing is not in itself either a service-providing or
law-administering function;8' yet it is necessary to the existence of
other state activities, some of which are clearly governmental and
others clearly proprietary in nature. Thus, it may be argued that the
borrowing function is governmental to the extent that it has tradi-
tionally been essential to the operation of the state in its sovereign
capacity. The validity of such a characterization may be ques-
tioned, however, when the activities supported by financing are
deemed proprietary."
If a narrow approach to the governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion were employed, the inquiry would be limited to an initial as-
sessment of whether the financing activity could be considered per
se a traditional or integral government function, that is, whether the
activity itself supports the conclusion that it is clearly a function to
be exercised by a state government, and hence deserving of protec-
tion from federal encroachment. It is submitted that this analysis
would perforce require a determination that the borrowing function
is proprietary in nature and therefore subject to full federal regula-
tion under the commerce power. On the other hand, an approach
emphasizing the nature of the state activities ultimately financed
by the issuance of securities would apparently require a case by case
determination based upon the purpose of the particular issue. In
this context, the fact that revenue from a bond issue would often
For a discussion of the pitfalls lurking behind this doctrine, see Doty & Petersen, The
Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 283, 362-
63 (1976).
" See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
1Z For instance, when tax free industrial development bonds were used increasingly for
the development of private industry, Congress removed from the worst-offending categories
of such bonds their exemption from federal bond interest taxation and securities regulation.
See I.R.C. § 103(c); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2), 78c(a)(12) (1970). See generally Industrial Devel-
opment Bonds, supra note 1.
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be expected to support both governmental and proprietary activi-
ties would seemingly complicate this analytical approach beyond
logical resolution. The governmental-proprietary test thus appears
as ill suited to determining the appropriate limits of tenth amend-
ment immunity as it has proved to be with respect to eleventh
amendment immunity from private suit in federal court. The uncer-
tainty engendered in the latter area by use of a governmental-
proprietary test has prompted the suggestion that it be discarded
as the basis for analysis of eleventh amendment immunity in the
municipal securities field unless "the entire borrowing function can
be viewed as a governmental activity."83 Similar policy considera-
tions would appear to dictate the same conclusion in the tenth
amendment context as well.84 If the courts choose to analyze the
financing activity via a governmental-proprietary test, they should
eschew case by case inquiry into the activity ultimately financed
and characterize the borrowing function per se as governmental in
nature. The judiciary could then utilize a balancing approach to
determine the propriety of the particular challenged federal regula-
tory scheme.
Unfortunately, per se characterization of financing as a govern-
mental activity in fact avoids rather than fulfills the test. The ne-
cessity of assuming what the governmental-proprietary test pur-
ports to establish demonstrates its inadequacy as a measure of the
constitutional permissibility of federal regulation of municipal is-
suers.
AN ALTERNATVE TO THE National League ANALYsis
Perhaps the strongest argument against application of the
governmental-proprietary test is its failure to take into considera-
tion another concern of the National League Court: whether the
determinations regulated were "'functions essential to a separate
" Doty & Petersen, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal
Securities, 71 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 283, 363 (1976).
9 As in the eleventh amendment context, a governmental-proprietary standard in the
tenth amendment context is premised upon the notion that certain governmental activities
are more easily identified as partaking of a state's sovereignty and hence more deserving of
protection from federal infringement. Although the financing function perhaps is not a clearly
governmental activity, it is a support function vital to the economic existence of the state.
Both short term and long term capital are essential to continued viability. Yet this borrowing
activity serves both governmental and nongovernmental activities, and the imposition upon
a municipal issuer of federal regulations which attempt to reach only that part of the borrow-
ing function directed at supporting the proprietary activities would appear to be impractica-
ble. Hence, it would seem that the only logical solution is to regard the entire function as
governmental.
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and independent existence.' "85 Whether a particular activity is tra-
ditionally governmental in nature may well be no measure of
whether it is essential to a state's continued autonomous existence.
The serious harm caused by the wage and hour legislation involved
National League was removal from the states of "decisions upon
which their systems for performance of these [police, fire, sanita-
tion, recreation] functions must rest."86 So too, where nontradi-
tional state activities are so disrupted as effectively to remove from
the states their decisionmaking capacity regarding essential func-
tions, state autonomy would appear to be as seriously affected as
when traditional functions are usurped. It would be illogical to pre-
clude a finding of unconstitutionality simply because the federal
legislation impinged upon a function not deemed to be traditional.
The same is true of situations in which state autonomy is indirectly
impaired as well. Whether a particular state function which the
federal government seeks to regulate is deemed governmental or
proprietary, integral or nonintegral, traditional or untraditional,
should not alone determine whether the federal government is in-
vading an area of heightened state concern. The only consistent
method of limiting the federal commerce power in order to preserve
state autonomy is to assess the regulation's ultimate impact upon
state policymaking initiatives. Where regulation, either directly or
indirectly through prohibitive cost increases, substantially limits
the state's available policy options in the exercise of its vital func-
tions, state autonomy has been impaired. As a result, the regulation
must be justified as the effectuation of a paramount federal interest
if it is to withstand a tenth amendment challenge. 87
426 U.S. at 845.
Id. at 851.
It has been suggested that National League should be construed to give the federal
judiciary a stake in the protection of state "autonomy interests." Note, Municipal Bank-
ruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HAiv. L. Rxv. 1871, 1886 (1976).
That student commentator suggests that where commerce clause legislation so burdens the
state as to threaten its capacity to make and enforce laws and provide critical public services,
a court must examine the legislation to determine if it comports with the federal system,
striking down those provisions which fail to accommodate conflicting state interests to the
fullest practicable extent. This would involve the application of a "less intrusive means"
standard. Id. at 1890. For criticism of the less intrusive means standard, see notes 88-91 &
accompanying text infra.
Before the "accommodation" of state and federal interests occurs, the commentator
proposes a two-step "process" examination to assure, first, that legislation is tailored to give
full voice to state interests, and second, that the legislation meets a "clear statement" rule:
absent a clear statement of congressional intent, courts should not interpret a regulation so
as to implicate these autonomy interests. Id. at 1888-90. It is submitted that the clear state-
ment standard is inapplicable in a tenth amendment context. See Tribe, supra note 1, at 688-
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Adoption of an approach which endeavors to safeguard state
autonomy by assessing the ultimate impact of a regulation upon
essential services and administrative functions might place a tighter
rein upon federal authority under the commerce power, but more
importantly, it would assure the states that careful consideration
will be given to their interests whenever federal regulatory legisla-
tion is contemplated. The appropriate intensity of scrutiny is a
matter of dispute. Although varying degrees of "less intrusive
means" analysis have been proposed,88 those courts which have
attempted to apply the National League rationale have either
ignored the balancing approach89 or balanced the interests involved
without careful examination of the availability of less drastic means
for substantially achieving the goals of the regulation." It may be
unrealistic to expect a federal court to inquire very closely into the
balancing process; indeed, it is uncertain whether such a delicate
weighing of the competing interests is either contemplated by
Justice Blackmun or included in the policy considerations underly-
ing the application of tenth amendment immunity. The interests of
the states traditionally have been represented and safeguarded in
Congress by representatives and senators who weigh the national
interest in federal legislation against the interests of their home
state." Thus, as long as courts require that the federal interests in
a particular legislative measure be substantial as compared to the
99. Although the clear statement approach has been employed in cases under the eleventh
amendment, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974) (congressional authorization
to sue states was wholly absent); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (absent clear language, Court would not
infer abrogation of immunity), Professor Tribe contends that eleventh amendment immunity
can be viewed as being conferred against the federal judiciary alone, with no effect upon
Congress' power to subject states to suit in federal court. Tribe, supra note 1, at 694. The
Court's insistence that Congress clearly state its intention to abrogate state immunity may
thus be regarded as an exercise of judicial restraint - a demand for explicit authorization
before a federal court will assume jurisdiction of a suit against a state. Where the tenth
amendment regulatory immunity is involved, however, it operates directly against congres-
sional authority under U.S. CONST. art. I, and a clear statement requirement will not cure
any constitutional defect.
I See, e.g., Note, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Threat to Federalism?, 76
COLUM. L. Rav. 990 (1976); Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New
Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1871 (1976).
8 See, e.g., Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Staten Island Rapid
Transit Operating Auth. v. IBEW Local 922, 177 N.Y.L.J. 42, Mar. 3, 1977, at 12, col. 4 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County). See generally note 75 and accompanying text supra.
11 See, e.g., Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., [1976] 2 LAB. L. REP. (Wages &
Hours) (CCH) (79 Lab. Cas.) 33,437 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1976), wherein the court summarily
stated that "the policies of social justice underlying the legislation outweigh the State interest
in exploiting employees because of their sex." Id., at 47,555 n.6.
91 See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rlv. 543 (1954).
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state interests in the regulated area, it would seem that the judi-
ciary is discharging its responsibility for safeguarding the federal
system.
The framework thus proposed for analysis of challenges to fed-
eral regulation of state activities is, like that suggested by National
League, two-pronged. In an attempt to avoid the difficulties inher-
ent in the governmental-proprietary test while still preserving a
healthy regard for state autonomy, it is submitted that the thresh-
old determination should involve a test of impairment of essential
services and administrative functions to determine whether a par-
ticular federal regulatory scheme should be subject to judicial scru-
tiny under the tenth amendment. In the event that the requisite
impairment is found, the court should then proceed to weigh the
federal interests in the legislation against the state interests which
it will affect to ensure that Congress gave due consideration to the
latter. If so, then the challenged legislation must be sustained as a
valid exercise of national authority under the commerce clause.
THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL
SEcurITIEs
SEC Injunctive Actions Under the Antifraud Provisions
As was previously stated, the antifraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts are the only federal securities regulations which apply
to municipal issuers.2 Recently, SEC efforts to invoke its long dor-
mant power to investigate possible violations of the antifraud provi-
sions by municipal issuers spurred a tenth amendment challenge by
New York City under the National League doctrine. Under the
proffered analysis, the first question to resolve would be whether
SEC investigation and regulation of municipal issuers threatens to
interfere with the municipality's service-providing function. If so,
then impairment of state autonomy should be sufficient to induce
judicial scrutiny of the competing federal and state interests via
application of a balancing test.
Although a municipality's ability to provide essential services
may be impaired by an SEC investigation of issuer misconduct,
investigation is neither affirmative nor negative regulation. Investi-
gation involves no imposition of affirmative duties or prohibitions
upon the municipality, which continues to operate independent of
92 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
13 Complaint, City of New York v. SEC, [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $i 95,667, at
90,276 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1976).
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federal input.94 Of course, the very fact that a federal regulatory
agency has initiated a formal inquiry into possible misconduct by
an issuer may have an adverse effect upon the marketability of that
issuer's securities, thus creating some hardship in the sale of notes
and bonds.95 Adverse publicity, however, is a factor external to state
autonomy. In the absence of some attempt to regulate municipal
issuers, states subject to such investigation may be regarded as
harmed but not injured.
An SEC injunctive action, on the other hand, is a regulatory or
prohibitive measure which can very drastically displace state fiscal
policy. If the SEC were able to bring a proceeding to enjoin a course
of municipal financing,9" it would apparently be able to impose upon
a city the entire gamut of ever-changing federal standards of disclo-
sure, scienter, causation, and materiality in an antifraud action.9"
The expense of compliance with disclosure responsibilities would be
a substantial fiscal burden, perhaps a crushing one in some locali-
ties, and would appear to constitute a disruption sufficient to invoke
application of a balancing test.98 Nonetheless, the federal interest in
protecting investors and ensuring the integrity and viability of the
national municipal securities market should certainly be regarded
as sufficient to justify this imposition upon the state borrowing
power.9"
"4 In this respect, it appears that New York City's suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief was premature, for the only issue germane at the time suit was filed related to the SEC's
power to compel testimony from city officials. The SEC pointed out that the city had cooper-
ated in the investigation, and that no decision had been made by the SEC to take any action
against the city. See S.E.C. Digest, 176 N.Y.L.J. 23, Aug. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 5, at 3, cols. 2, 3.
"1 In the New York City case, this possibility was anticipated by the SEC, which sought
to minimize the deleterious effects of the inevitable leakage of facts concerning the investiga-
tion by taking the unusual step of publicly announcing the commencement of the investiga-
tion. See Commission Press Release, Jan. 8, 1976; note 11 supra.
1, A serious threshold doubt exists as to the extent of the availability of injunctive relief
against states and municipalities. Considerations of federalism act as a restraint upon federal
equity power where a state or municipality is engaged in a governing function. In this situa-
tion "appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the
availability and scope of equitable relief." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). This
consideration may take the form of strict scienter requirements for subjection to an injunc-
tion, or the unavailability of ancillary relief in the context of an injunctive proceeding. See
generally Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1779 (1976); Comnient, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1188 (1975). -
" See Complaint, City of New York v. SEC, [1976] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,667,
at 90,276 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1976).
" See Casey & Smith, supra note 2, at 662.
" Cf. Chazen, More Regulation of Municipals, Greater Disclosure on the Horizon, 176
N.Y.L.J. 112, Dec. 13, 1976, at 35, col. 1, col. 3 (civil enforcement action "would seem to
have a very good chance of withstanding Constitutional attack"); Doty & Petersen, The
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Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation
Although renewed congressional interest in the need for in-
creased regulation of municipal issuers did not produce any legisla-
tion in 1976, proponents of federal controls continue to support such
legislation."' Federal regulation of municipal issuers has heretofore
been foreclosed by political constraints and federalism concerns, 10
but, barring the applicability of a tenth amendment limitation to
any new enactments, it would appear that such an enactment would
be a constitutionally viable exercise of the commerce power.
Legislation first proposed in 1976 by Senator Williams"°' would
require extensive disclosure by all large municipal issuers0 3 as well
as a distribution statement for all issues of significant size.' It
would also mandate that disclosure reports and distribution state-
ments be maintained for public examination in accordance with
SEC requirements. 05 The bill would delegate to the SEC broad
rulemaking power to facilitate implementation of the disclosure
Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 283, 366-
67 (1976) (discussing liability of states under antifraud provisions).
"' See H.R. 2724, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5600, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
See generally Chazen, More Regulation of Municipals, Greater Disclosure on the Horizon, 176
N.Y.L.J. 112, Dec. 13, 1976, at 35, col. 1. Pressure for disclosure legislation is likely to ease
with the respite in fiscal distress. For instance, the market responded quite favorably to the
New York Court of Appeals decision invalidating as a violation of the state constitution the
legislative moratorium upon the payment of New York City notes. Flushing Nat'l Bank v.
Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). This
demonstration of fiscal responsibility aided the cities and towns in New York State in their
efforts to market new issues. See City's Notes Climb; M.A. C. Bonds Rally, N.Y. Times, Nov.
23, 1976, at 1, col. 5, at 57, cols. 2-3.
,"t See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
'20 S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See note 8 supra.
"I Section 13A(a)(1) of the proposed statute would characterize as a large municipal
issuer one whose principal outstanding aggregate amount of securities exceeds $50 million.
S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 13A(a)(1) (1976). Such issuers would be required to prepare
annual reports pursuant to SEC guidelines, including therein if applicable: (a) identification
and description of the issuer; (b) legal limitations upon the incurrence of indebtedness by,
or taxing authority of, the issuer; (c) debt structure of the issuer; (d) contingent liabilities or
commitments; (e) a 20-year history of defaults; (f) a 5-year record of tax authority and
structure; (g) a description of the issuer's major taxpayers; (h) the governmental and other
services provided by the issuer; (i) the nature and extent of federal and other assistance
programs; and 0) recent financial statements audited and reported upon by an independent
public accountant. Id. § 13A(a)(2).
10, Issues with a principal amount exceeding $5 million would have to prepare a distribu-
tion statement, id. § 13A(b)(1), containing: (a) an offering description; (b) the security
offered; (c) description of the project(s) or enterprise(s) to be financed; (d) description of the
intended use of the proceeds; (e) statement of counsel's opinion regarding legality; Cf) state-
ment of the availability of the required reports; and (g) whatever else the SEC should require.
Id. § 13A(b)(2).
10 Id. § 13A(f)(3).
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scheme." 6 In an effort to accomodate those states which already
regulate disclosure by municipal issuers,107 however, issuers whose
disclosure scheme has been approved by a duly authorized state
authority would be exempted from the distribution statement re-
quirement105
Applying the previously suggested constitutional analysis, it
appears that the Williams proposal would not be barred by the
tenth amendment. Clearly, the disclosure requirements in the bill
would impose substantial costs upon municipal issuers. In many
circumstances such expenses could, either directly or indirectly,
disturb state fiscal policies.109 Municipal governments require short-
term financing to anticipate tax revenues and long-term financing
to facilitate capital development. Increased offering costs could sig-
nificantly affect state fiscal resources, thereby foreclosing certain
state policy options and disrupting state autonomy interests to an
extent sufficient to support the institution of a tenth amendment
challenge.
Having satisfied the threshold "impact" test under the pro-
posed analysis, the competing federal and state interests must be
balanced to ascertain the constitutionality of the proposed legisla-
tion. It would appear that state interests in deficit financing unfet-
tered by federal disclosure requirements are substantial. State in-
terests in a secure financial status as well as in governmental and
political autonomy clearly are compromised by the proposed re-
quirements. On the other hand, the substantiality of the state inter-
ests involved is balanced by the practical need for disclosure suffi-
cient to instill investor confidence in the municipal securities mar-
"' For example, the SEC would be empowered to adjust the minimum dollar standards
for applicability of the proposed legislation, and to prescribe the form of financial statements
and the applicable accounting methods. Id. § 13A(f).
101 For an interesting discussion of North Carolina's efforts in the area of state regulation
of municipal issuers, see Hearings on S. 2574 & S. 2969 Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 117-19,
136-37, 204-05 (1976).
113 S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 13A(c) (1976).
10, States provide critical services which are at best marginally profitable and do not
attract private enterprise. The tax-exempt status of most municipal bonds, see Industrial
Development Bonds, supra note 1, is at least in part a reflection of the realization that the
added burden of tax or regulation could impose difficult choices upon the state:
Many state activities are in marginal enterprises where private capital refuses to
venture. Add to the cost of these projects a federal tax and the social program may
be destroyed before it can be launched. In any case, the repercussions of such a
fundamental change on the credit of the States and on their programs to take care
of the needy and to build for the future would be considerable.
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 593-94 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ket.'" 0 Also weighted against the state interests are the federal inter-
ests in a uniform national market for municipal deficit financing
and the protection of individual investors. The interest in national
uniformity of disclosure regulation is also sufficient for the more
efficient utilization of capital which would be promoted as investors
became better able to evaluate the relative merits and liabilities of
competing issues."' As a result, after balancing, it would appear
that the federal interests in this legislation far outweigh the compet-
ing state interests. In view of the comparatively minimal intrusion
upon state autonomy likely to be caused by the additional cost of
disclosure requirements, the Williams bill would appear to be well
within the limits of congressional power under the commerce
clause 112
A more drastic regulatory measure, however, has been proposed
by Senator Eagleton,"3 who would repeal entirely the general ex-
emption for municipal securities presently contained in the 1933
Act."4 Such a measure would subject municipal issuers to the full
panoply of registration requirements, including SEC review of dis-
closure documents."15 In comparison to the Williams proposal, the
Eagleton bill appears to be a far more drastic means of effectuating
substantially identical federal interests in the regulation of munici-
pal issuers. The constitutionality of the Eagleton bill, as contrasted
to the Williams bill, would be a much more difficult proposition if
evaluated under the broad balancing test previously suggested. Yet,
if the federal interests which it is intended to promote can be consid-
ered more substantial than the competing state interests, perhaps
this regulatory measure also would be sustained.
,,0 Restoration of the investor confidence lost due to the New York City financial crisis
is a major motivation for the imposition of disclosure standards. One presumed effect of
disclosure would be, in contradistinction to the state claim of financial hardship, lower
interest rates and a consequent lessening of borrowing costs to the state. The SEC contends
that regulation "facilitates the creation of a viable municipal securities market in which
States can raise funds with which to carry out their traditional function." SEC, Underwriters
Voice Support for Municipal Full Disclosure Act, SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 368, at A-
3 (Sept. 1, 1976).
See Federal Regulation, supra note 3, at 590.
,,2 See Casey & Smith, supra note 2, at 661-62; Chazen, More Regulation of Municipals,
Greater Disclosure on the Horizon, 176 N.Y.L.J. 112, Dec. 13, 1976, at 35, col. 1.
,,3 S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See note 8 supra.
114 See Securities Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). The Eagleton bill would
add a § 3(d), however, which would leave to the SEC discretion to exempt any class of
municipal securities which it believes unnecessary to regulate. S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ b (1975).
"I The Williams bill would require preparation and maintenance of disclosure docu-
ments, but apparently the process would not ordinarily involve SEC review. S. 2969, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 13A(f)(3) (1976).
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Determination of the precise effect of the tenth amendment
upon the municipal securities field will become a necessity if Con-
gress seeks to provide more comprehensive federal regulation of
municipal securities. The present subjection of municipal issuers to
the antifraud provisions alone, however, is a minimal intrusion with
practically no disruptive impact upon municipal administration,
particularly since the disclosure necessary to comply with the anti-
fraud provisions is, as a practical matter, being forced upon munici-
pal issuers by market pressures.
ACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The eleventh amendment operates to bar suits brought in fed-
eral court by private citizens against the states and their instrumen-
talities. Although by its terms it does not shield a state from suits
by its own citizens,"' the amendment has long been construed to
achieve that effect."7 In regard to private actions brought pursuant
to the securities laws, it thus appears that state issuers can avoid
liability absent a waiver of their eleventh amendment immunity.
The question of waiver is complicated, however, by the Court's will-
ingness to imply consent to suit on the part of the state."'
The eleventh amendment has never been thought to prevent
suits against states by the United States. Consent to suit by the
federal government is considered implicit in the states' adoption of
a federal system wherein certain powers are delegated to the central
government along with sufficient judicial authority to enforce their
exercise."' Since Congress has delegated to the SEC responsibility
"' U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
"I In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Court declined jurisdiction over a suit
by a citizen of Louisiana against that state for recovery of interest accrued upon bonds which
the state had repudiated. The plaintiff had argued that the plain language of the amendment
did not bar his action, inasmuch as it was not addressed to actions by citizens against their
own states. Id. at 10. The Hans Court, noting the origin of the amendment as a reaction to
the literal construction of the Constitution in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
wherein it was held that the judicial power extended to controversies "between a State and
citizens of another State," believed it anomalous to construe it strictly so as to permit an
action which had been unknown to the law. 134 U.S. at 15 (1890). See also C. JACOBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 109-10 (1972).
,,8 See notes 124-29 and accompanying text infra.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965). Suits by states
against states are similarly justified, for such jurisdiction was conferred upon the Court as a
substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies between sovereign governments. See,
e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923). The eleventh amendment is
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for enforcement of the secutrities laws and investigation of sus-
pected violations,1 20 the Commission acts as the alter ego of the
United States with regard to securities regulation. Although the
SEC has not yet had occasion to utilize its powers in an action
against state issuers of municipal securities, it is apparent that the
states may not invoke the immunity to defeat such actions.' 2' It
seems that, at present, all municipal issuers otherwise immune from
suit under the eleventh amendment can be subjected to the SEC
investigation and antifraud enforcement provisions absent a finding
of tenth amendment immunity.122 Moreover, should Congress abol-
ish the exempt status of municipal issuers under the securities acts
and extend the coverage of their substantive regulatory measures to
municipal securities, the eleventh amendment should present no
impediment to SEC enforcement actions.' 23
Exceptions to the Immunity
As previously indicated, a state can waive its immunity from
private suit. In the past the Supreme Court had shown a willingness
to construe as a waiver a state's involvement in an area of activity
regulated by Congress under the commerce clause.'24 This doctrine
effective, however, against suits by foreign states against states. In Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313 (1934), the Court distinguished a suit by a foreign government as not within
the exceptions to the amendment necessitated by the federal system:
The foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union. The waiver or consent,
on the part of a State, which inheres in the acceptance of the constitutional plan,
runs to the other States who have likewise accepted that plan, and to the United
States as the sovereign which the Constitution creates. We perceive no ground upon
which it can be said that any waiver or consent by a State of the Union has run in
favor of a foreign State. As to suits brought by a foreign State, we think that the
States of the Union retain the same immunity that they enjoy with respect to suits
by individuals ....
Id. at 330.
I" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78u (1970).
121 Cf. Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975),
wherein the court found that a suit brought pursuant to congressional authority by the
Secretary of Labor to enforce the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA was not barred by
Iowa's assertion of immunity. It was held that the action, although brought in the public
interest, was a suit by the United States. 494 F.2d at 103, citing Employees of the Dep't of
Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1973)
(dictum) (although private action is barred, Secretary of Labor can bring suit on behalf of
individuals). For a suggestion that the dictum in Employees yields anomalous results under
the federal system, see Tribe, supra note 1, at 698 n.79.
'2 See notes 92-99 and accompanying text supra.
'2 The statute would, however, be subject to scrutiny under federalism principles. See
notes 92-103 and accompanying text supra.
"I4 See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). In that case, the Court held that
by operating a railroad in interstate commerce Alabama had necessarily waived its sovereign
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of constructive waiver reflected the Court's conviction that Con-
gress' plenary commerce power brooked no restrictions by the
states, so that congressional authorization of enforcement of federal
regulation by private actions necessarily abrogated the immunity.1 5
Subsequently, however, the Court has determined that a waiver of
the immunity will not be presumed absent a clear statement of
congressional intent."6 It thus appears that private actions under
the antifraud provisions, 27 since they are judicially implied reme-
dies, ' will not lie against a state issuer unless and until Congress
expressly authorizes them.' 9
The eleventh amendment immunity extends to a state officer
acting in his official capacity, for he is in that instance an alter ego
of the state. To subject the officer to a judgment for damages would
contravene an important purpose of the amendment, the prevention
of diminution of the state's fiscal resources, for such damages ulti-
mately would be the financial responsibility of the state.'30 Under
the doctrine of Ex parte Young,' however, courts may enjoin state
officials from enforcing unconstitutional state laws and from admin-
istering valid laws wrongfully. 32 Moreover, Congress could provide
immunity and consented to suit under a congressionally created right of action. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, reasoned that the states had "surrendered a portion of their
sovereignty" in delegating to Congress the power to regulate commerce, and thus Congress'
exercise of that power to establish private rights of action against the states was not precluded
by sovereign immunity. Since amenability to suit was a condition to operating a railroad in
interstate commerce, the states had, by such operation, consented to suit. Id. at 191, 192.
'= Id. at 192.
' See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974) (fact of congressional authorization
to sue states is wholly absent); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973) (Congress will not be presumed by its
silence to have abrogated the immunity).
"I Securities Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970); Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1970).
1,8 Neither of the antifraud provisions, see note 127 supra, expressly provides for private
damage actions, and whether such an action does or should exist under the 1933 Act is still a
matter of serious controversy. See 6 L. Loss, SEcuarmEs REGULATION 3913-14 (2d ed. Supp.
1969); Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act - The Wrong Place for a Private
Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 44, 44-53 (1973).
'" See Note, Disclosure by Issuers of Municipal Securities: An Analysis of Recent Pro-
posals and a Suggested Approach, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1017, 1052 (1976).
131 See In reAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 491 (1887). It has been suggested that a state's voluntary
assumption of an official's liability should not be a sufficient predicate for extention of
eleventh amendment immunity to such an official. See Tribe, supra note 1, at 686 n.25.
131 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
,2I Such an injunction does not in theory operate against the state, for it does not interfere
with the officer's discretion regarding the enforcement of state law since "the officer is simply
prohibited from doing an act which he had no legal right to do." Id. at 159. See also Greene
v. Louisville & Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 506-07 (1917) (state officials may be enjoined
where valid laws are wrongfully administered).
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for private actions against officers in their individual capacities for
material misstatements or omissions in disclosure documents.rs
State subdivisions receive varied treatment under the eleventh
amendment, reflecting the degree to which they are perceived to be
distinct from the state. State agency liability under the securities
laws thus must be resolved on an individual basis. Agencies which
lack financial independence will generally be regarded as instru-
mentalities of the state, while those with the power to raise capital
and sue or be sued in their own right will be unable to participate
in the state's immunity. 34 Political subdivisions, on the other hand,
clearly do not enjoy eleventh amendment immunity from suit.'13
Although states delegate to counties and municipalities the power
to perform governmental functions on behalf of the state, these
subdivisions are considered politically distinct, and thus beyond the
express language of the amendment.'36 It would therefore appear
that eleventh amendment immunity is never a bar to the liability
of counties and municipalities under the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws.
Private Actions Against Municipal Issuers Under Rule 10b-5
Problems of local issuer liability to suit are sufficiently unclear
to raise serious questions in a series of cases arising from the recent
New York City fiscal crisis and the alleged "bailout" by certain
bondholders from their municipal security holdings with the knowl-
edge and aid of city officials. A total of four actions were instituted,
,1 See Hearings on S. 2574 & S. 2969 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 522-24 (1976). For a
discussion of the propriety of subjecting elected officials to personal liability for violations of
the securities laws, see Federal Regulation, supra note 3, at 592-94.
'u The test of a state agency's amenability to suit is the presence or absence of the state
itself as a real party in interest. Of the factors which may be considered in determining
presence, "'ultimate State liability' is the most determinative." George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177, 180 (lst Cir. 1974). See Soni v. Board of
Trustees, 513 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2623 (1976) (amenability of state
universities to suit must be determined individually on basis of circumstances).
"3 Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). The Lincoln County Court quickly
disposed of the county's contention that, as an integral part of the state, it enjoyed immunity
under the eleventh amendment, stating:
[Wihile the county is territorially a part of the State, yet politically it is also a
corporation created by and with such powers as are given to it by the State. In this
respect it is a part of the State only in that remote sense in which any ... municipal
corporation may be said to be a part of the State.
Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
,"I Lowes v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 125 F. Supp. 681, 683 (M.D. Pa. 1954); see
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 645 (1911).
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all currently seeking class action status.1 37 In these actions, holders
of New York City notes and bonds alleged that they were injured
when the defendant commercial banks and brokerage houses, aware
that the city was on the verge of default, undertook to conceal the
true financial condition of the city and to market further issues of
notes and bonds, using the proceeds from these issues to reduce
their own enormous holdings in New York City securities. 3 8 The
city, its mayor, and comptroller allegedly were aiders and abettors
in this scheme.'39
Professionals in the municipal securities industry are apprehen-
sive that the courts in these suits will hold that municipal issuers
or officers have no liability to purchasers,'4 ° since a finding of no
issuer liability might visit upon underwriters the spectre of enor-
mous liability under the securities laws.' The result of such fears
will likely be increasing pressure by underwriters upon municipal
issuers to make full disclosure of all circumstances surrounding the
issuance of securities.
Private pressure, if successful in impelling voluntary disclosure,
will be a major step towards skirting the dilemma of commerce
power limitations in the area of securities regulation, while simula-
taneously increasing the impetus for a statutory limitation of liabil-
ity for underwriters.1 2 Should political pressures induce some states
to impose liability upon municipal issuers, it may become economi-
cally expedient for other issuers to waive immunity so as to compete
with municipal issues which are better secured by reason of the
issuer's liability.
'" Friedlander v. City of New York, 75 Civ. No. 3981 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13, 1975);
Spector v. City of New York, 75 Civ. No. 5461 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 31, 1975); Goldfarb v.
City of New York, 75 Civ. No. 5581 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 7, 1975); Weisberg v. City of New
York, 75 Civ. No. 5582 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 7, 1975).
See Friedlander v. City of New York, 75 Civ. No. 3981 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13, 1975).
'5' Id. For a discussion of the potential civil liability of municipal officers in this context,
see Sykes, Civil Liability of Public Officers Under Federal Securities Statutes for Municipal
Bond Misrepresentations, 2 URBAN LAw. 219 (1970).
11 See Hearings on S. 2574 & S. 2969 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1976) (statement
of Donald R. Hodgman).
"' Id. at 250.
'= Such a limitation was proposed as part of Senator Williams' bill: "in no event shall
any underwriter of an issue of municipal securities (unless such underwriter shall have know-
ingly received.., some benefit... ) be liable in, or as a consequence of, any suit for damages
in excess of the total price at which the issue was sold by it to the public." S. 2969, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., § 13A(g)(3) at 8-9 (1976). See notes 102-08 and accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION
In National League, the Supreme Court has embarked upon the
elucidation of a heretofore unrecognized affirmative limitation upon
Congress' power under the commerce clause to impose regulation
upon the states as states. The standards which will guide the appli-
cation of this limitation await clarification in future decisions.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the nature of the municipal finance
function will mandate reevaluation of the Court's analysis of the
availability of tenth amendment regulatory immunity should Con-
gress decide to enact stringent controls over municipal issuers.
It is submitted that pursuant to the analytical framework pro-
posed above for consideration of tenth amendment challenges, a
court should focus upon the "bottom line" and consider whether a
particular course of regulation impairs state capacities by imposing
increased costs upon the state. While the governmental-proprietary
approach would involve the courts in a conceptual maze of formida-
ble proportions, the suggested standard offers ease of application
and more relevant gauge of the state interests which merit protec-
tion. Application of this approach to the municipal financing func-
tion indicates that federal regulatory efforts in the field do consti-
tute an appropriate occasion for a balancing of competing interests.
From a national viewpoint, the federal government has an over-
riding interest in preserving the stability of the municipal securities
market. The commerce power was a result of the recognition that a
uniform economic policy is often essential to national survival. In
National League, the Court has indicated that it will carefully scru-
tinize attempts to use the commerce power as a predicate for impos-
ing federal regulation on state functions in furtherance of social
interests such as wage and hour policy. Clearly, however, the com-
merce clause should exert a particularly compelling force when the
federal interest advanced is that policy of national commercial
unity which was the raison d'etre for state delegation to a central
government of the power to regulate interstate commerce.
From the state viewpoint, the securities market constitutes not
a commercial enterprise engaged in for profit, but an instrument
essential to financing government and services. The state's interest
in freedom from fiscal manipulation certainly is of the first order.
For the federal system to serve as it was intended to, state economic
autonomy must be jealously guarded from all unnecessary intru-
sions by the central government. Yet in the federal system vital
national interests should supersede all conflicting state interests, no
matter how essential.
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Because the field of municipal securities involves such impor-
tant interests from the state viewpoint, it is an appropriate area for
careful consideration of the state interests implicated in any pro-
gram of federal regulation. In view of the heightened awareness of
the municipal securities market, Congress is quite likely to be fully
apprised of state interest in this regard, and it may safely be antici-
pated that the state interests will be fully voiced and appropriately
represented in any new federal enactment. Regardless of National
League of Cities v. Usery, the primary limitation upon the com-
merce power is, and must remain, the political process.
Robert J. Brady
